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SHOULD WE HAVE A LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION?
Louis Michael Seidman*
Here is a modest proposal: If I had the power to rewrite the
United States Constitution, I would first take some time to think
hard about the sort of country I wanted to live in. Having done
my homework, I would then draft language that, to the best of
my ability, insured that we had such a country. Some of the
language would be substantive—for example, guaranteeing the
rights that I think people ought to have and directly
commanding outcomes that I think we ought to reach. Of course,
there would also be procedural provisions. Various powers
would be allocated and divided, various offices created and the
duties of their occupants specified, and various practical details
sorted out. But all of these procedural provisions would have but
a single purpose—to produce the substantive outcomes that I
preferred.
On one level, this approach seems both obvious and
question-begging. It is obvious because, after all, what else
would one possibly expect? Of course my choice of a
constitution will be dictated by my hopes for the country to be
governed by the constitution. It is question-begging because it
leaves unresolved the really hard issues about what sort of
country I should want to live in and about what sort of
constitutional design would create such a country.
On another level, though, my proposal is deeply
controversial. The constitution I drafted would not provide a
level playing field on which people with different conceptions of
justice could do battle. It would not be neutral as between
competing conceptions of the good. It would not provide terms
of fair cooperation for people with different such conceptions. It
would not leave to individuals operating within a private sphere
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. Thanks to Jill Hasday, Michael Klarman, Gregory Klass, Girardeau Spann,
Mark Tushnet, and Robin West for commenting on an earlier draft.
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the workings out of the distribution of resources or the pursuit of
their own conception of happiness. Because my constitution
would resolve, or attempt to resolve, all these matters in a
particular and controversial way, it would not be democratic. In
short, my constitution would lack all the hallmarks of
constitutional liberalism.
In this brief essay, I attempt to accomplish two things. In
Part I, I defend my proposed constitution against its putative
liberal critics. In Part II, I argue that given contingent but highly
plausible empirical assumptions, the differences between my
constitution and a liberal constitution are less dramatic than one
might suppose. There are often sound, nonliberal grounds for
supporting institutional arrangements that appear liberal. It
turns out, then, that liberalism is both less attractive (Part I) and
less necessary (Part II) than its defenders suppose.
I. IN DEFENSE OF MY CONSTITUTION
(OR HOW FANTASIZING ABOUT ABSOLUTE POWER
CAN BE REALLY FUN, BUT ALSO QUITE DISTURBING)
Before mounting a defense of my nonliberal constitution,
we need to dispose of a move that would short-circuit the
argument. Perhaps the kind of country I want (or should want)
should be organized around liberal virtues. Perhaps, in other
words, I should value for its own sake a system marked by what I
take to be the main features of constitutional liberalism: a
commitment to procedural fairness, a large private sphere,
expansive negative rights, and neutrality with regard to matters
1
of religion and other conceptions of the good. If these are my
substantive preferences, then, obviously, I will end up supporting
a liberal constitution that encourages these outcomes. To make
the argument interesting, then, we need to assume that, as a
substantive matter, I prefer something else. For example, I might
think that a fair distribution of resources is central to justice and
that a liberal society will not produce this distribution. Or I
might worry that we face an environmental catastrophe and that
liberal politics cannot be counted on to fend off disaster. Or I
might believe that a particular set of religious beliefs is simply
true and that a just society must be organized around those

1. There is, of course, a problem as to how one defines liberalism. The label is
deeply ambiguous. For purposes of this essay, I am defining it as a theory that privileges
the virtues I have mentioned in text. One might claim with some plausibility that these
virtues are so vague and open-ended that they have no actual bite.
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beliefs. Perhaps these positions are misguided—perhaps I ought
to be a liberal. The question I want to address, though, is
whether someone like me who is not persuaded by liberalism as
a substantive matter should nonetheless favor a liberal
constitution.
At first, it may seem that setting up the argument in this
way makes things way too easy. If we start by stipulating the
truth of nonliberalism as a substantive matter, then it would
seem to follow apodictically that our constitution should be
nonliberal. In fact, though, the stipulation clarifies an important
point that, in turn, helps support a position the truth of which is
not merely built into a controversial premise.
The point is that substantive liberalism, itself, entails a
contestable substantive program that requires a substantive
defense. For this reason, liberal constitutionalism is bedeviled by
a well-known contradiction. Its chief attraction is its claim to
neutrality as between various reasonable political and moral
positions. Liberals seize on this neutrality to insist that their
doctrine can be embraced by adherents to all these positions.
But liberalism cannot be neutral about itself. By definition, a
liberal constitution biases outcomes toward liberalism and is,
therefore, not “fair” to nonliberalism.
The controversial position that follows from this point is
that people who favor nonliberal constitutions should not be
subject to special criticism on the ground that they are rejecting
“fairness” in the sense of an ex ante right of all persons to equal
treatment and regard. All constitutions—including supposedly
liberal ones—take contestable positions on points of
disagreement. They are all “unfair” to people who have different
positions and all of them treat these people unequally. There is
therefore no ground for privileging liberal constitutions before
the argument about substantive liberalism even begins.
I have made this point abstractly, but it may help to make it
concretely with regard to our own Constitution. Defenders of
the U.S. Constitution often argue that it is liberal in the sense
that its binding force derives from the fact that it is an agreement
that people with a wide variety of substantive conceptions of
justice can accept. As Justice Holmes famously said, it is “made
2
for people of fundamentally differing views.” Several
generations after Holmes wrote, John Hart Ely argued that our

2. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Constitution was liberal in the sense that it was overwhelmingly
about fair procedures. He claimed that for the most part the
Constitution did not resolve controversial questions of
substantive value but, instead, left them for a democratic process
3
that was fair to all participants in the polity. In our own time,
libertarians like Randy Barnett, while less enthusiastic about
democracy than Holmes and Ely, nonetheless argue that we
have a liberal constitution in the sense that it protects a large
sphere for individual liberty. For this reason, they claim, our
Constitution should be attractive to people with different
4
substantive conceptions of the good. All of these thinkers,
writing within different versions of the liberal constitutional
tradition, claim that the U.S. Constitution is worthy of respect
because it is transsubstantive.
These claims are demonstrably false. They are also deeply
ironic given our Constitution’s origins. The United States
Constitution was not written so as to provide common ground
for people who disagreed about issues that mattered. Although
its apologists persist in ignoring or denying the fact, it is simply
the case that an important driving force behind the new
constitution came from speculators in Revolutionary War debt
who had bought up the debt at pennies on the dollar and then
wanted the government to impose taxes high enough to insure
5
that the debt was redeemed at face value. The Constitution was
meant to reduce the power of the state governments that
threatened these interests and, more broadly, to protect the
emerging commercial class at the expense of farmers and
6
debtors. Southern delegates were happy to go along with this
agenda, but they also demanded an additional price: numerous
7
provisions that protected and entrenched slavery.
All this is ancient history, but even as amended and
interpreted, our modern Constitution is hardly a blank substantive slate. We can begin with the substantive conceptions of
justice that it pretty clearly rules out. Pace Pat Robertson, it
3. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
4. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
5. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 34–35 (1913). For the best recent account with elaborate
documentation, see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2007).
6. BEARD, supra note 5, at 52–63.
7. Id. at 29–30, 169–70, 176–77, 192.
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does not permit a Christian theocracy. Pace Mark Tushnet, its
protections for private property strongly discourage socialism.
Pace Holmes and Ely, institutions like the Senate, the Electoral
College and the Supreme Court mean that it does not even
permit anything like serious democracy.
Then there are the things that our Constitution requires or
strongly encourages. It mandates active government intervention
to protect existing distributions of property and private market
ordering. For the most part, it obliges the victims of injury
imposed by speech to bear their own losses. It encourages
political gridlock. It puts all of us at the mercy of a single person
who is vested with the capacity to blow up the world.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these supposed defects
in our Constitution mean that it should be condemned. It is nonneutral with regard to the matters described above, but it is not
as if some other constitution could be neutral. My point is only
that all constitutions, including our own, promote some political
outcomes and obstruct others. These outcomes require a defense
on the merits, and the defense cannot simply be that this is what
liberalism requires.
There is, to be sure, a response to these complaints. Perhaps
the Constitution is sufficiently open-textured that it does not
really command any of these results. True, some readings of the
text seem more plausible than others, and some readings seem
completely implausible. But the substantive yoke the Constitution apparently imposes on us is actually an artifact of
existing power distributions, or at least so the argument goes.
Change the distributions and other interpretations of the
document will suddenly become plausible.
For example, our system of separated and divided powers
strongly encourages gridlock, but presidents like Franklin
Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson managed to overcome these
hurdles. The free speech clause is open to readings, and
occasionally has been read, to force speakers to pay for some of
8
the injuries their speech causes. The claim that the Obama
administration has produced socialism is nonsense, but it is true
that the recent economic crisis has produced a greater degree of
public ownership and control over some segments of the
economy. Constitutional structure encourages presidential power,

8. E.g., Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (Col. 1997) (recognizing a tort claim for the
public disclosure of private facts and affirming an award of compensatory damages).
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but it took the intersection of that structure with twentiethcentury developments to produce it.
Given our existing Constitution, and given my own
substantive commitments, I think that it is important for people
to understand how open-textured the Constitution is. The best
hope for our existing Constitution is that people will come to see
its invocation of grand ideas like liberty, equality, and a “more
perfect union” as open for exploitation by any side of any
dispute. One might advance this understanding on liberal
grounds: Only a constitution that is completely unsettled
provides grounds for fair cooperation among people with
different views. But, as I will argue in the next Part, the
understanding can also serve nonliberal ends. Anyone opposed
to the outcomes that our current Constitution produces will have
an incentive to persuade people that the Constitution, properly
understood, need not dictate these outcomes.
The question before us, though, is not what understanding
we should have of our existing Constitution, but how to draft a
new one. If we really believed that constitutional language was
wholly irrelevant—that its meaning was wholly dictated by
power relationships—then there would be no point to the
exercise. The project makes sense only if, as I believe to be true,
there is a dialectical relationship between text and power.
Interpretation of text is often or always an artifact of power
distributions, but the text also helps constitute those
distributions in the first place. Any new text that we draft will be
vulnerable to new interpretations as social and material facts
change. Still, that text will have some role in establishing and
preserving those social and material facts.
If all this is right, then it follows that a drafter needs to think
first and foremost about how he wants that power distributed.
Neutrality is not an option. All political arrangements, including
those entrenched by our present Constitution, privilege some at
the expense of others. Choices about who benefits and who is
hurt are both inevitable and inevitably controversial.
One would suppose that all of this was obvious were it not
for the frequency with which it is denied. Why are so many so
resistant to these conclusions? Some of the problem is caused by
misunderstanding. At first, it might seem that the position I
advance here is selfish and arrogant. Why privilege my whims
and preferences over everyone else’s? How can I be so certain
that I am right?
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There is something to this complaint if one means by it that
a constitution drafter should worry deeply about her
responsibility. After all, she has the fate of an entire society in
her hands. But this worry and responsibility is built into the
hypothetical situation we are asked to address. If I alone were
given the power to rewrite the Constitution, then, of course, I
would ultimately have to resolve contested issues in the way that
I think best. It would be very odd—maybe even conceptually
impossible—for me to resolve these questions any other way.
It does not follow that I would resolve them selfishly or
without consulting others. To be sure, one substantive theory of
constitutional governance is that our polity should maximize my
personal happiness and preference satisfaction. If this were my
theory, then I would draft a constitution that attempted to
implement it. But then I would be subject to legitimate criticism
for advancing a very poor constitutional theory. In fact, as it
happens, this is not a theory that I hold, and I doubt that many
others do either. There is simply no logical connection between
the premise that my constitution must inevitably advance my
own theory and the conclusion that it would advance a selfish
theory.
Nor does it follow that I would insist on my own
omniscience and infallibility. In fact, I am well aware of my own
limitations (or at least, perhaps arrogantly, I think that I am),
and I would do my best to take account of these limitations as I
went about my task. I would listen to what others have to say,
and I would surely recognize that changing material and cultural
conditions might make rigid constitutional language counterproductive in the future. I would need to think hard about the
merits of the advice I received, about how specific my
constitutional language should be, and about what institutions
should be assigned the tasks of interpretation and application
going forward.
The fact remains that after I had done all this, it is, once
again, simply built into the hypothetical situation that I would be
responsible for the draft constitution that I produced.
Ultimately, I am the one who must decide whose advice to
accept, what language to include, what to specify now and what
to leave to future generations. Humility should not be confused
with cowardice, and doubt and modesty are no excuse for
leaving the task unfinished. After all, if I did not draft the
document, someone else would, and then the document would
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incorporate her ideas rather than mine. And if I thought that her
ideas were better than mine, then her ideas would be mine.
There is another set of objections the answers to which may
not be directly built into the hypothetical problem. If my
constitution reflects no more than my own conception of the
kind of country I want to live in, then what makes it legitimate?
Why should someone with a different conception feel any
obligation to obey it? The problem of constitutional obligation is
vexing and complex, and I will not set out a full theory here.
Instead, what follows is a sketch addressed to the particular
question before us—whether we should have a liberal
constitution.
One solution to the legitimacy problem might once again be
built into the hypothetical situation. Perhaps we are to imagine
that I have somehow been given not only the task of drafting a
new constitution, but also the authority to promulgate it. If I
have been authorized to promulgate the constitution, then this
authority, whatever its source, also makes my constitution
legitimate and obligates others to obey it.
Even if I have not been endowed with authority in this
sense, perhaps we are to imagine that I have been granted
sufficient power to coerce compliance. Why worry about
legitimacy if one has power? Indeed, if we build omnipotence
into the hypothetical, why worry about a constitution at all?
With sufficient power, I could simply command the outcomes I
desired without bothering to justify them by reference to a
document written out beforehand.
But this solution is too simple. Apart from whatever moral
qualms one has about naked coercion, there are conceptual
difficulties with the assumption that effective coercive power can
ever exist absent some sort of persuasion. No one person has the
physical power to compel an entire society. Even in a brutal,
totalitarian country, the regime’s enforcers, thugs though they
be, must be persuaded to obey the dictator. To be sure, they
might be persuaded by bribes, but then the dictator must
persuade the person who collects and stores the money to
dispense it as the dictator directs. Ultimately, it turns out, there
must be some kind of politics in every society, however
authoritarian.
The question, then, is what will drive this politics? There are
three possibilities. First, there is the politics of self-interest.
People might be motivated to obey by, say, fear of death or
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imprisonment, monetary or other material rewards and
deprivations, and the like. In other words, the regime might use
negative and positive incentives to buy off or scare off its
opponents.
There is no reason to disparage this politics. As argued
above, no political system can rest solely on coercion, but no
political system—even a democratic one—can survive without it
either. With the largest per capita prison population in the
world, it hardly befits the United States to complain about state
9
coercion in the service of regime maintenance. Moreover, the
belief that people respond to economic pressures premised on
self-interest is central to the market economies that liberals
favor. Still, the politics of self-interest, standing alone, is not only
unlovely, but also quite inefficient. A regime dependent on this
politics must bear the cost of continually providing the carrots
and sticks necessary for its own preservation.
A more hopeful and efficient possibility is the politics of
moral responsibility. When this sort of politics works, people feel
a justified obligation to follow the dictates of a constitution and
of subrules authorized by that constitution, even if it is not in
their immediate self interest to do so. What might give rise to
such an obligation? Liberals claim that the obligation derives
from the transsubstantive character of their constitutions. People
feel, and should feel, an obligation to obey such a constitution
because it is “made for people of fundamentally differing views.”
But we have already seen that this claim is false. If constitutions
are not and cannot be transsubstantive, then what is left is an
obligation grounded in belief in the contestable substantive ends
that a particular constitution seeks to advance. On this view,
then, liberals will feel a justified obligation to obey only liberal
constitutions, theocrats only theocratic constitutions, and so
forth.
To be sure, no constitution is ideal. Liberals, theocrats, and
everyone else will have to make a judgment about whether a
given nonideal constitution is nonetheless worthy of respect on
the ground that its unraveling would produce worse results than
its preservation. Perhaps the current constitution is the best deal
on offer, and the benefits derived from it entail a reciprocal
obligation to put up with its burdens. But, of course, it might also
9. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN 2008, at 5 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_
FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf [hereinafter CENTER ON THE STATES].
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be possible that the constitution can be disaggregated with the
good parts preserved and the bad parts jettisoned or
undermined. Or perhaps imperfections can be corrected at no
appreciable cost if we started over. No doubt, citizens will be
forced to make difficult contextual political calculations. The
important point, though, is that these calculations will be
grounded in controversial substantive theories of justice, and
people with different theories will come to different conclusions.
In a diverse society like our own, this possibility of
splintering and disunion is troubling. The great goal of constitutional governance is to provide unity among people who
disagree about fundamentals. How is this goal to be achieved if
constitutional obedience turns upon belief in the very doctrines
that divide us? This problem leads to the third sort of politics
that might produce obedience and, so, civic peace, in a society
that disagreed about fundamentals. This is the politics of
obfuscation. Perhaps people who, in justice, have no obligation
to obey a particular constitution might nonetheless be tricked
into believing that they have such an obligation. This sort of
politics avoids the necessity of coercion by inducing voluntary
compliance, while also avoiding the problem of fundamental
disagreement by persuading people (falsely) that a biased
constitution is really neutral. The next section is devoted to this
possibility.
II. CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN A NONIDEAL SETTING
(OR HOW TO STOP FANTASIZING AND MANAGE A
SOFT LANDING INTO THE REAL WORLD)
So far, I have patiently indulged this Symposium’s
organizers by taking their hypothetical situation at more or less
face value. At this point, though, it is useful to ask some
subversive questions about the world that they ask us to imagine.
In particular, just how did it come about that I—a lone law
professor, and a politically and culturally marginal one at that—
was empowered to draft a new constitution for the United States
of America? I must confess that, try as I might, I cannot get my
mind around the circumstances that would produce this result.
There are really only two possibilities: Either the
counterfactual politics of this alternative universe is radically,
unrecognizably different from our own, or the counterfactual me
who lives in this universe is radically, unrecognizably different
from the real me. So we are asking, in effect, how a Mike
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Seidman, who is not Mike Seidman, would draft a constitution
for a United States that is not the United States. With no actual
experience living in a different skin in this different world, I
cannot begin to imagine the contours of the constitution that
would result.
In order to make the thought experiment more coherent
and interesting, we must imagine a situation closer to the world
we actually live in. Three facts stand out about this world. First,
in the real world, someone like me would have a marginal
impact at best on the shape of a new constitution. I and my
allies (such as they are) can expect to be consistently outvoted,
overpowered, or, most likely, simply ignored. We would be
fighting a desperate, rear-guard action, trying to stave off truly
terrible outcomes and making only very occasional and very
marginal advances. The relevant question, then, is not what sort
of constitution to draft with all the power, but how to avoid
disaster with virtually no power.
This is emphatically not a world where one has the luxury to
work out ideal political theory or to take principled and
uncompromising stands on issues of institutional design. It is an
environment that privileges finely honed political instincts and
craftiness rather than deep thought and theoretical insight.
Better a Lee Atwater or Rahm Emanuel than a Roberto Unger
or John Rawls.
Second, like it or not, in our actual world, constitutional
liberalism is the reigning ideology. No brilliant law review article
or inspired work of political theory is about to change that. It
will not do, then, to insist that liberalism is incoherent,
contradictory, vapid, or evil. It is a fact on the ground that we
must deal with rather than simply assume away.
Third, in our current world, people who share my views are
quite vulnerable and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable
future. This is a world, therefore, that puts a premium on the
acceptance of Nietzsche’s slave morality. No doubt, at first, this
claim seems quite implausible—perhaps, even paranoid. After
all, I occupy a privileged status in our society. I am economically
more than comfortable with a not-very-demanding tenured
position (and, as if this were not enough, protection into my
dotage by the Age Discrimination Act!) that, for reasons that
escape me, commands high social prestige. My own
extraordinary good fortune, however, should not distract us from
the fact that many others with outsider mentalities are in much
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more danger of serious retaliation. We live in a society with a
vast government security apparatus and a private, disciplinary
culture that constantly brandishes, and occasionally uses, the
power to crush its enemies. Moreover, we need to entertain the
possibility that even the privileged, leftist elite may owe its
relative security to the very liberal culture it deplores.
This last point suggests a strategy for dealing with our
imagined constitutional moment in something like our real
world. From the defensive crouch that we necessarily occupy,
people like me need to focus on the clear and present danger of
catastrophic loss rather than the remote possibility of dramatic
gain. It turns out that constitutional liberalism, already regnant,
can be exploited to serve this purpose. Features of liberalism like
civil liberties, procedural regularity, frequent elections, and
pretensions to neutrality can provide at least some cover for
unpopular outsiders.
I do not mean to exaggerate the extent of this protection.
We have learned from sad experience that, all too often,
liberalism’s velvet glove hides an iron fist. It is asking a bit much
of the radicals rounded up during and immediately after World
War I, of McCarthy’s victims in the 1950’s, or of today’s
supporters of a free Palestine to expect them to sit through a
lecture about liberalism’s virtues. Still, constitutional liberalism
offers some protection. It has the capacity to convince some
people, some of the time, that they have an obligation to tolerate
views that they hate. It provides some space for political
organization and pressure that would not otherwise be available.
Moreover, even if we abandon our defensive crouch and
proceed with more self-confidence, constitutional liberalism may
still have an important role to play. Perhaps the right strategy for
outsiders is to choose a few relatively unimportant provisions
and devote all of their limited political power to including them.
Even if they succeeded at the drafting stage, however, they still
face the problem of insuring that people take these new
provisions seriously. We have already seen that the politics of
self-interest has its limits and that the politics of moral
responsibility is not transsubstantive. How, then, can we assure
obedience among people who disagree with substantive ends
that we favor and that have, somehow been at least partially
embedded in the constitution?
Including within the Constitution some of the trappings of
liberalism may provide a solution to this problem. The feature of
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liberalism most useful in this regard is its uncanny ability (at
least in our political culture) to persuade people of their duty to
obey even when the politics of self interest and of moral
responsibility fail. Viewed in one way, liberalism’s obfuscatory
potential is precisely its problem. Supposedly expansive
individual rights, supposedly free elections, a supposedly neutral
playing field—all of these institutions serve to justify outcomes
that should outrage us. On one view, then, outsiders should
devote their energy to breaking down this ideology of
legitimation.
The other view, though, is that this approach is either
hopeless or foolish. It is hopeless because constitutional
liberalism is too deeply engrained in our political culture to be
displaced. It is foolish because any constitution, even my
nonliberal one, will require a mechanism that convinces the
populace to obey, and, given our present political culture,
liberalism’s pretentions to being transubstantive provide such a
mechanism.
It is important to understand just how limited and qualified
this endorsement of constitutional liberalism is. First, I
emphatically do not mean to endorse liberalism as a principled
matter. My view is far removed from John Rawls’ position that
10
liberalism is necessary for political justice in a diverse society. I
do not even endorse the view that he rejects—that liberalism
11
might provide a mere modus vivendi for divergent groups.
Rather, my view is analogous to that entertained by some
Catholics before Vatican II and before John Courtney Murray’s
influential reinterpretation of Catholic doctrine for an American
audience. Some pre-Vatican II Catholics treated religious
toleration as a contingent good to be supported only when and
12
to the extent that it advanced the interests of Catholics. So,
too, we might treat constitutional liberals as “useful idiots” who,
at this particular moment in history, deserve our support
because, but only to the extent that, they offer some protection
to political outsiders and legitimation for good, nonliberal
constitutional provisions.
Second, my commitment to a seemingly liberal constitution
is necessarily temporary, partial, and pragmatic. Because the
10. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
11. Id. at 148.
12. For an excellent account of the older Catholic view and of Murray’s role in
producing change, see generally Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian
Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297 (1997).

!!!SEIDMAN-273-SHOULDWEHAVEALIBERALCONSTITUTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)11/17/2011 2:32 PM

554

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 27:541

commitment is not to liberalism itself, but to the nonliberal
causes that liberalism aids at this historical moment, it is subject
to termination as soon as liberalism no longer aids those causes.
Moreover, a constitution that was thoroughly liberal would, by
definition, not advance nonliberal causes. What is required, then,
is an outer liberal façade just thick enough to legitimate and
protect the substantive, nonliberal provisions that lie within.
No doubt, these views will strike many as unprincipled and
perhaps even as deeply immoral. Unsurprisingly, I think these
charges miss the mark. The partial and pragmatic embrace of
liberalism that I advocate is motivated by deep commitment to
principle, albeit not to liberal principle. It is precisely the desire
to further and protect these principles that motivates the search
for a strategy that shields them from attack. To be sure, the
strategy does not prioritize procedural principles. It does not
treat “fair” and “neutral” processes as ends in themselves.
Instead, institutions instantiating these processes are goods only
so long as they advance the right substantive principles. But this
is only to say that the strategy is not liberal (no surprise there),
and it is surely unfair and non-neutral to claim that only liberals
act out of principle.
Another charge is more troubling. As I have already
conceded, my embrace of liberalism is premised on liberalism’s
obfuscatory and legitimating potential. As such, the strategy
arguably fails to treat others as autonomous equals. It assumes
that our fellow citizens are mere objects to be manipulated
rather than human beings to be heard and respected. I am
prepared to concede that nonliberal principles need not
prioritize fair and neutral procedures. It is another thing
altogether to cede to liberalism alone concern for individual
autonomy and respect. On the contrary, my quarrel with
constitutional liberalism is precisely that it accords too little
attention to these concerns. So if my approach is indeed
incompatible with autonomy and respect, then it is also
incompatible with the constitutional ideals that I embrace.
I must confess that I am troubled by this charge. If it is right,
then we need a constitution that comes as close as possible to
being authentically transsubstantive. I have argued elsewhere
that such a constitution would be deeply unsettled. It would be
written in open-ended terms that could be used by people of all
13
views to advance their causes. This is the best version of liberal
13. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
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constitutionalism—the best version of our Constitution—and it
surely has its attractions. If one privileges civic peace and
unfettered discourse, then perhaps it is the best that we can do.
And, as I have just argued, even if one does not privilege these
goods and, indeed, is not a liberal, such a Constitution may
provide the best cover for the pursuit of nonliberal causes under
our present conditions.
Ultimately, though, for reasons discussed above, I do not
think that even an unsettled constitution can be truly
transsubstantive. Nor do I believe that a merely pragmatic
embrace of liberalism is inconsistent with the respect that we
owe to others. One must first note the deeply ironic nature of
the latter charge. Recall that the complaint is about the inclusion
of some liberal elements in our Constitution. How can liberals
object to this? True, my motivation for this inclusion stems from
a belief that liberalism merely obfuscates and legitimates. But if
I am wrong about this—if a liberal Constitution really does
respect dignity and autonomy as liberals insist—then there is
surely no problem with the inclusion of these elements. If I am
right, then my putative liberal critics need to reconsider their
liberalism.
Perhaps more to the point, there is indeed good reason for
liberals to reconsider their liberalism. The silent premise of their
argument is that, but for the deeply cynical intervention of
political radicals, Americans would regularly exercise
meaningful political autonomy. If liberal constitutionalism were
serving the goals that it sets for itself, this might be correct. In
fact, though, anyone who pays any attention knows how false
this claim is. Our society is marked by a huge and growing gap
between rich and poor that has a deeply corrosive effect on our
14
politics. We have an astonishing percentage of our population
behind bars and an even larger percentage living in the shadows
and excluded from political participation because they are not
15
citizens. Our existing political culture is shot through with
ignorance, lies, misinformation, manipulation, and subtle but
nonetheless very effective forms of coercion. In a political
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
14. See Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation, in THE
UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 166, 167–68 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Desmond S.
King eds., 2009).
15. See CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 9, at 5; PEW HISPANIC CENTER,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1
(2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (finding that unauthorized
immigrants constitute 3.7 percent of the U.S. population).
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environment as degraded as this, the truly cynical move is to
condemn people who recognize the truth of our situation and
who try to use their knowledge of the truth to make things
better.
In the end, I hardly expect that this defense will convince
liberals. There is a sense, though, in which this disagreement
itself punctures liberal pretensions. The dispute demonstrates,
yet again, that constitutional liberalism cannot bridge
disagreements between people of good will as to what is to be
done. Of course, this problem can be avoided if one pretends
that people like me simply do not exist or that, if we exist at all,
we are not people of good will. In other words, the liberal myth
of a transsubstantive constitutional order can survive, but only if
liberals deny to my side the respect and autonomy that they
claim for themselves. And that denial is hardly liberal, is it?

